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“Can They Do That?”: Why Religious Parents and
Communities May Fear the Future Regarding State
Interests and Custodial Law
I. INTRODUCTION
“To rip up hundreds of parents and children and put them in a
makeshift prison while you investigate to see if they did anything
wrong is un-American,” according to attorney Dick DeGuerin.1
“You shouldn’t be allowed to search a whole village on the basis of a
phone call[,] and not only search the area where there might be
evidence but search every residence in the village[.] That’s never
happened in American jurisprudence,” stated Tucson attorney Mike
Piccarreta.2 These comments referenced the State of Texas’s April
2008 actions toward the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints (“FLDS”), where Texas law enforcement officers
and the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
(“DFPS”) raided the FLDS’s Yearning for Zion Ranch (“YFZ
Ranch”) location in search of an allegedly sexually abused 16-yearold female.3 Although the supposed victim was never found, Texas
officials eventually took 468 children4 from the YFZ Ranch, allegedly
because of an “immediate” and “urgent” need for removal5 based
upon the community’s common belief system and living style.

1. William M. Welch, Papers Detail Alleged Abuse at Sect’s Compound, USA TODAY
(Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-04-08-polygamy_N.htm
(quoting Dick DeGuerin because of his past experience with private religious communities,
including negotiating on behalf of David Koresh with federal authorities during the Branch
Davidian standoff in Waco, Texas).
2. Guy Murray, Texas Authorities Release FLDS Raid Affidavit, MESSENGER AND
ADVOCATE (Apr. 9, 2008, 6:37 AM), http://messengerandadvocate.wordpress.com/
2008/04/09/texas-authorities-release-flds-raid-affidavit/ (Mike Piccarreta’s interview with
Arizona media outlet KVOA).
3. Timeline of Raid on FLDS-Owned YFZ Ranch, DESERET NEWS (May 23, 2008),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700228439/ [hereinafter Timeline].
4. Jessica Dixon Weaver, The Texas Mis-Step: Why the Largest Child Removal in Modern
U.S. History Failed, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 449, 452 (2010).
5. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(b)(1)–(3) (West 2010) (setting forth Texas’
statutory requirements regarding child removal, including urgent and immediate need for
removal when the child’s health or safety is in danger).
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DFPS’s invasion of the YFZ Ranch community constituted an
almost unprecedented child removal operation. Although past
attempts against similar communities have occurred,6 this focus on
child removal apart from polygamy7 was unique and may cause
parental concern regarding state removal and termination actions
within a religious context.8
Undoubtedly, physical, sexual, and psychological child abuse
constitute deplorable activities, and suspected occurrences should be
investigated and potentially prosecuted.9 A child found within that
situation should be assisted and provided protection (within
constitutional statutory guidelines).10 However, are state actions
toward protecting children from potential abuse (as happened at
YFZ Ranch) justified in an immediate removal of virtually all
children living within a religious community upon the basis that the
potential practice of the community’s “pervasive belief system”
perpetuates an abusive situation and can be imputed to every parent
within the community?11
6. See, e.g., MARTHA SONNTAG BRADLEY, KIDNAPPED FROM THAT LAND: THE
GOVERNMENT RAIDS ON THE SHORT CREEK POLYGAMISTS 48–96 (1993) (describing
significant government action in arresting polygamous individuals and taking over 200 children
into state custody); BRIAN C. HALES, MODERN POLYGAMY AND MORMON
FUNDAMENTALISM: THE GENERATIONS AFTER THE MANIFESTO 272–73, 309–18 (2006)
(discussing 1953 Arizona state action to arrest Mormon fundamentalists living in polygamous
relationships within Short Creek, Arizona); see also Ken Driggs, “This Will Someday Be the Head
and Not the Tail of the Church”: A History of the Mormon Fundamentalists at Short Creek, 43 J.
CHURCH & ST. 49 (2001) (describing the establishment of Short Creek, Arizona by
polygamous families).
7. Weaver, supra note 4, at 534 (“Texas did not enter the YFZ Ranch with the express
intent of arresting all the adults for the crime of polygamy as Arizona did in 1953 . . . .”).
8. Although this Comment could look at removal standards based solely on
polygamous behavior, it instead will focus on removal standards relating to religion in general.
9. See, e.g., Tara Dodrill, Texas Polygamy Case Should Spur Changes in Child Removal
Across the Nation, ASSOCIATED CONTENT (June 27, 2008), http://tinyurl.com/78dxg26 (“If
even one child suffers as a result [of sexual or physical abuse], then by all means . . . remove the
young person from the abusive household environment.”).
10. Out of fear of being misunderstood, I would like to repeat for emphasis: Removal
and termination actions by accountable agencies (utilizing unambiguous statutory procedures
and guidelines) can be applauded where truly warranted by actual sexual, mental, or physical
abuse. This Comment is only intended to explore the possibility of unjust removal actions
involving religious parents and what possible recourse they may have. It is not intended to
justify perpetrators of sorrow who hurt the most vulnerable and precious members of our
society.
11. Weaver, supra note 4, at 452. Another problematic element that could be
considered is the unsubstantiated phone call supposedly warranting the initial invasion and
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Other religious parents and communities may be understandably
concerned with the potential for similar governmental actions and
accompanying justifications focused on religious belief. These
parents and communities may wonder how DFPS actions comport
with typical child removal and termination standards, and how these
standards apply in a religious context.12 There may be legitimate fear
that child removal and termination of parental rights could occur
based on specific religious beliefs seen as “pervasive” throughout a
religious community.13 This fear may escalate if a religious
community’s pervasive beliefs could be assumed as belonging to
every parent within the community, thus implying that each parent
will practice every tenant of those beliefs, especially if this created an
immediate and urgent need for child removal in the eyes of the State.
In other words, can a child be removed, and parental rights
terminated, for religious reasons?
This Comment explores child removal and parental right
termination standards in order to determine whether either action
can overtly or covertly occur under a religious pretext, and what
potential protections religious parents and communities would have
in such a situation. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that,
although DFPS’s actions at the YFZ Ranch could cause alarm for
religious parents and communities, parents’ religious beliefs and
actions concerning their children likely will not warrant removal
and/or termination absent a clear and convincing showing that the

serving as the catalyst of the removal process for minors not involved with the call or its
contents.
12. There are additional, relevant questions unaddressed by this Comment regarding
child removal based on a parent’s religious beliefs impacting the child, each of which would
alter the analysis. These include whether state action is influenced depending on the religious
community involved, the sect’s popularity level, or the context of doctrinal application (e.g.,
blood transfusions, vaccinations, home schooling, corporal punishment, etc). See, e.g., Jennifer
E. Chen, Family Conflicts: The Role of Religion in Refusing Medical Treatment for Minors, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 643 (2007) (exploring the intersection between interests and rights involved in
a religious parent refusing medical treatment for their child); Howard Friedman, Church
Leaders, Parents Charged with Child Abuse in “Biblical Punishment” of Their Children,
RELIGION CLAUSE (Mar. 23, 2011, 7:10 AM), http://religionclause.blogspot.com/
2011/03/church-leaders-parents-charged-with.html (discussing parents in a Wisconsin church
being charged with abusing their children for using rods to spank them out of a religious belief
in punishment).
13. Weaver, supra note 4, at 500–01 (discussing the State’s expert witness’s comments
regarding the FLDS belief system’s troubling aspects including emphasis on beliefs of
obedience, faith, honoring God, and eternal reward).
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effect of such belief causes significant abuse.14 Therefore, judicial and
legislative protections are in place to determine whether removal and
termination can occur under perceived arbitrary state action within a
religious context.15 However, despite these protections, religious
parents may maintain some apprehension because removal and
termination actions for religious reasons could potentially still be
justified under broad statutory definitions and judicial interpretations
based on potential subjectivity often inherent in terms such as
“abuse,”
“social
good,”
“welfare,”
and
“aggravated
circumstances.”16 To protect from this potential subjectivity, relevant
child welfare statutes should be enhanced with specific definitions for
prospectively ambiguous terminology regarding state removal
actions.
Part II of this Comment details the history, facts, and
motivations behind DFPS’s raid of the YFZ Ranch, delineating three
general justifications used for removal and the inferences creating
potential fear in religious parents and communities. Part III provides
an analytical framework for discussing removal in the religious
context by briefly describing general legal standards for child
removal, termination of parental rights, and judicial tensions
between constitutionally protected parental rights and state interests
in protecting children. It also briefly addresses the potentially
irreversible damage that results to children when unjustifiably
removed from parental care. Part IV discusses the role of religion in
the removal and termination process, arguing that usually religion
only becomes a factor in removal proceedings when the belief system
directly results in actual child mistreatment. In addition, it outlines
potential protections religious parents receive from judicial review of
removal actions for statutory compliance, as demonstrated by the
court system’s ultimate rejection of DFPS’s mass removal action.
Part V summarizes dangerous inferences that could be made based
on DFPS’s removal reasoning and the legal protections religious
parents may receive in such circumstances. It concludes by exploring
the potential dangers of judicial activism and statutory ambiguity if
removal becomes a pretext for religious hostility.

14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part III. These protections include (but ultimately are not limited to) due
process concerns, high evidentiary standards, strictly construed statutory requirements, etc.
16. See infra Part IV and Part V.
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II. “DEEP IN THE HEART OF TEXAS”: RESCUE FROM A RELIGIOUS
COMMUNITY
The FLDS church initially purchased the 1700-acre YFZ Ranch
in 2004 and renovated it into a relatively small community, including
“orchards, gardens, a school, dairy,”17 a temple, a 29,000-squarefoot house for their “prophet,”18 and “multi-story residential
household complexes.”19 DFPS’s initial investigation of the YFZ
Ranch was prompted by several phone calls received from an
allegedly 16-year-old female20 currently living within the
community.21 On March 29–30, 2008, this supposed teenaged
mother telephoned a local family shelter multiple times expressing a
desire to leave “her current living situation.”22 The individual
declared her involvement in a plural “spiritual marriage” at the age
of 15 with an adult male over thirty years her senior,23 resulting in
her having given birth to one child and being pregnant with a
second child.24 The caller described the abusive situation she lived
under at the ranch, including that she had been beaten, choked,
sexually abused, and kept against her will.25
Because accusations of child sexual abuse are considered a
“priority one” situation, DFPS and police responded within twentyfour hours in a joint investigation.26 Based on these telephone calls,
17. Nancy Perkins, FLDS Struggle Beyond YFZ Ranch Borders, DESERET NEWS (Aug.
25, 2008, 12:15 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700253581/FLDS-strugglebeyond-YFZ-Ranch-borders.html.
18. Thomas Korosec, West Texas Polygamist Compound Worries Some, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE (Mar. 6, 2005, 6:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/
metropolitan/3069543.html.
19. Aff. in Supp. of Original Pet. for Protection of a Child in an Emergency and for
Conservatorship in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship at 2 (51st Dist. Ct. Schleicher
County, Tex. Apr. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Affidavit].
20. Don Teague, Polygamist “Girls” Surprise Investigators, MSNBC.COM (May 21,
2008,
6:33
PM),
http://fieldnotes.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2008/05/21/4377396polygamist-girls-surprise-investigators (noting that the caller was considered a real person in
the investigation up until May 18, 2008, at which point authorities acknowledged she did not
exist and began investigating the hoax calls as potentially being made by a Colorado adult
“with a history of making false reports”).
21. Affidavit, supra note 19, at 2–4.
22. Id. at 3.
23. Timeline, supra note 3; see also Affidavit, supra note 19, at 3.
24. Affidavit, supra note 19, at 2–3.
25. Id. at 3.
26. Weaver, supra note 4, at 459–60 (describing the procedures and statutes
authorizing combined agency and state police action in child abuse situations).
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DFPS obtained orders and authorization to investigate the YFZ
Ranch concerning these child abuse allegations, including
interviewing and transporting children from the ranch.27 On April 3,
2008, Texas law enforcement officers and DFPS officials entered the
FLDS’s YFZ Ranch in search of the 16-year-old female caller.28
While searching for and interviewing individuals possibly connected
to the caller, investigators observed numerous “young” girls who
“appeared to be” pregnant minors or minors who had already given
birth.29
In addition, DFPS purportedly discovered patterns potentially
placing children at the YFZ Ranch at risk of “emotional, physical
and/or sexual abuse.”30 FLDS practices allegedly placing the
children in immediate danger included the determination that minor
female children were indoctrinated and groomed “to accept spiritual
marriages” and sexual relationships with adult men after reaching
“child bearing age.”31 In addition, “minor boys” were allegedly
taught to become “sexual[] perpetrators” by entering spiritual
marriages and sexual relationships with minor females after reaching
adulthood.32
Because of perceived neglect, sexual abuse, and immediate
danger to the children’s health and safety, DFPS determined that
continued residence at the YFZ Ranch was contrary to the welfare of
all female and male minors currently residing there.33 Eventually,
468 children were taken from the location and placed into Texas’s
“temporary managing conservatorship.”34 DFPS justified broadreaching removal of virtually every child at the location because it
viewed the YFZ community as constituting “one household” with a
common, “pervasive belief system” condoning underage marriage

27. Affidavit, supra note 19, at 4.
28. Timeline, supra note 3.
29. Affidavit, supra note 19, at 5. See Murray, supra note 2 (suggesting problems
regarding agency action based on the “appearance” of pregnant minors without factual
verification; however, this problem is partially created by the community’s avoidance of
answering agency questions about age, family status, etc.).
30. Affidavit, supra note 19, at 5.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.; cf. Teague, supra note 20 (noting that DFPS’s actions occurred despite its
eventual acknowledgment that the original caller/victim did not actually exist).
34. Weaver, supra note 4, at 452.
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and sexual activity.35 According to DFPS, the FLDS belief system
(combined with finding, during its investigation, five minor females
who became pregnant between age fifteen and sixteen) created a
danger warranting urgent protection and immediate removal of all
children from their parents and homes.36
Therefore, according to DFPS, the YFZ Ranch community’s
assumed belief structure evidenced an immediate need for removal of
any endangered children, and these beliefs could be inferred as
applying to every person currently living within the community.37 As
stated by DFPS’s lead investigator, “living under an umbrella of
belief that having children at a young age is a blessing” created an
environment where no child would be considered safe.38 This broadsweeping removal action was taken despite a lack of evidence (as
acknowledged by DPFS) indicating that any prepubescent males or
females were victims, or in danger of being victims, of actual physical
or sexual abuse.39
At first glance, many observers felt DFPS’s actions were
warranted and well-justified.40 However, as time progressed and
media attention proliferated, questions arose regarding the agency’s
process and justifications for such seemingly broad actions.41 A
second look at the situation uncovered a potentially disturbing
realization: a mass child removal action had occurred because of a
religious community’s tight-knit culture and commonly held beliefs.
35. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1, *2–3 (Tex. App.
May 22, 2008); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.107(b), 201(d) (West 2010) (indicating
a court may consider whether a household includes a person who has “sexually abused another
child” in determining whether there is continuing danger to the child’s physical health or
safety).
36. Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3.
37. Affidavit, supra note 19, at 5. (“Based on the [investigation, DFPS] determined that
an immediate danger exists to the physical health or safety of the children who are residents of
the YFZ Ranch . . . and that their continuing [residence on the Ranch] would be contrary to
the children’s welfare.”).
38. Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3 n.8.
39. Id. at *2.
40. See, e.g., Trouble in the Hills, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 9, 2008, 8:00 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/2008/04/09/trouble-in-the-hills.html (quoting the Eldorado
First Baptist Church Pastor as saying the raid would enable numerous people to have a better
life, and that the raid was “worth it” even if only “one person could be salvaged from child
abuse”).
41. Weaver, supra note 4, at 489 & n.359 (explaining that many media members posed
the question of whether “this case [was] more about the disapproval of a particular religion or
the alleged abuse of children”).
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This common belief system, and ascription of the term “family” to a
community of believers, supposedly warranted taking every parent’s
child within the community without regard as to whether or not
those particular children were actually at risk.42 This reasoning and
quick assertion of agency power chilled some observers who
reasoned by analogy that if broad child removal could occur in this
situation, then it could potentially occur in a number of other
situations involving theological beliefs within similar religious
communities.43
Thus, the YFZ Ranch case demonstrates potential for a child
removal action to hinge on a determination that: 1) a church’s
“pervasive belief system” can perpetuate an abusive situation through
the potential future practice of the belief, 2) a community of
believers can be considered the same as a “family unit” and thus the
“pervasive belief system” can be inferred to be held by every member
of the religious community, and 3) a belief system can necessitate the
urgent need for immediate removal of minor children from their
parents.44
III. JUDICIAL TENSIONS AND LEGAL STANDARDS FOR REMOVAL
ACTIONS
A. Parental Rights to Raise v. State’s Right to Intervene
The YFZ Ranch situation involves constitutionally important
(albeit judicially uncommon) competing interests and a philosophical
clash between a parent’s fundamental right to raise his or her

42. Id. at 494–95.
43. See, e.g., Jeff Lindsay, Don’t Mess With the Reich of Texas: The Abuse of Children by
the State, MORMANITY (Apr. 15, 2008, 8:32 PM), http://mormanity.blogspot.com/
2008/04/dont-mess-with-reich-of-texas-abuse-of.html (acknowledging, in blog post and
comments, troubling aspects within FLDS culture, but questioning the dangerous precedent of
such a “heavy-handed community-wide” action potentially justifying child removal for other
religious groups considered “strange”); see also Lee Benson, Texas Raid Violating U.S. Rights,
DESERET NEWS, (Apr. 9, 2008, 1:04 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
695268584/Texas-raid-violating-US-rights.html (expressing astonishment that such an
occurrence happened in 21st century America, while generating minimal, general outrage);
Janet, Tabs on Texas, FEMINIST MORMON HOUSEWIVES (Apr. 15, 2008),
http://www.feministmormonhousewives.org/?p=1747 (“To a frightening degree, we’re
caught in a large scale ‘he said, she said’ debate between competing cultures.”).
44. Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2. An additional issue left for future exploration
concerns how an unsubstantiated phone call can warrant investigation and removal if the
situation “appears” harmful.
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children and the state’s interest in the societal impact of a child’s
welfare and upbringing.45
1. The federal level
The Supreme Court has spoken on these issues in several
landmark cases, which help to outline the adversarial nature of this
topic and define the “playing field” for state removals and
terminations. These cases are significant because recognition of
parental rights as “fundamental” ensures due process protection of
such rights before they can be abridged by government action.46
Child removal heavily involves a parent’s substantive due process
rights.47 Even in strained relationships, the Court has declared that
individuals facing “dissolution of their parental rights” possess a
critical need for “fundamentally fair procedures.”48 Although the
YFZ Ranch case never escalated to the level of having to examine
removal in light of Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns,
the Supreme Court’s previous rulings declare that religious parents
receive due process (and, to a degree, First Amendment49) protection
of the right to raise their children with particular religious beliefs
without worrying that those beliefs may be arbitrarily adjudicated as
abusive and deserving of termination.
First, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court held that parents have
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights pertaining to the
upbringing of their children.50 The Court specifically stated that
45. Brittany Nilson, Note, Yearning for Zion Ranch Raid: Lowering the Standard of
Proof for the Termination of Parental Rights, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 305, 307 (2009).
46. See Rebecca Bonagura, Redefining the Baseline: Reasonable Efforts, Family
Preservation, and Parenting Foster Children in New York, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 175,
210–12 (2008); Nilson, supra note 45, at 310. But see James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and
Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1427,
1447 (1994) (arguing that courts should recognize the “illegitimacy of the parents’ rights
doctrine” because parent rights generally trump state intervention “simply because there is a
long tradition of letting parents do what they want . . . absent a threat of grievous harm”).
47. Bonagura, supra note 46, at 211 (stating that a parent’s substantive due process
rights are implicated in removal action because of parental rights and interests in the
companionship and custody of their child).
48. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982).
49. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234–36 (1972) (holding that both the First
and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from forcing Amish parents to send their
children to high school).
50. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)
(asserting that the right to raise one’s children is a civil right “far more precious . . . than
property rights”); Nilson, supra note 46, at 308–09.
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“[w]ithout doubt,” liberty denotes freedom to establish a home and
raise children.51 As such, state interests are balanced against
fundamental rights of personal liberty (including parental rights).52
The Court also acknowledged a parent’s due process right in Troxel
v. Granville.53 Although a plurality decision, Troxel fell in line with
case law determining that parents have a constitutional right to raise,
nurture, and educate their children without undue state influence.54
The Troxel plurality opinion concludes that the State is not justified
in questioning a “fit” parent’s ability to make decisions concerning
the rearing of his or her children.55
Additionally, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court held that a
statute regulating parents’ educational choices for their children
unreasonably interfered with parents’ liberty to direct their children’s
upbringing.56 The Court pontificated that a child was “not the mere
creature of the state”; instead, nurturers (and those directing the
child’s destiny) possess the right and duty to prepare the child for
life’s obligations.57
Federal circuit courts have also consistently upheld parents’
fundamental due process rights where child custody is involved. The
First Circuit notes that this liberty interest is protected by the Due
Process Clause’s substantive and procedural aspects guaranteeing
“fair process” and constraining governmental interference.58
Regarding child removal actions lacking parental consent and judicial
authorization, the Second Circuit held that a mother’s parental
liberty interest trumped state interests because of a lack of “notice

51. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
52. Id. at 399–400 (“[L]iberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of
protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect.”).
53. 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion).
54. Id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (declaring that the Court has perpetually
considered Pierce and Meyer to include a Fourteenth Amendment right for parents to care for
and nurture their child “free from state intervention”); see, e.g., id. at 67 (plurality opinion).
55. Id. at 68–69 (plurality opinion).
56. 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
57. Id. at 535.
58. Suboh v. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 91 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)); see also Hatch v. Dep’t for Children,
Youth & Their Families, 274 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2001).
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and an opportunity to be heard.”59 Moreover, the Third,60 Fourth,61
and Sixth62 Circuits have held similarly.
However, the Supreme Court has held that fundamental liberties
associated with parenthood can be limited in proportion to
significant state interests. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court
outlined the “no man’s land” between parental and state conflict
over child control, which takes on extraserious implications when
religious conviction enters the equation.63 The Court held “the
family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against
a claim of religious liberty . . . [or] rights of parenthood.”64 The
Court, previous to Prince, suggested potential areas of exemption
from absolute free exercise rights because of secular society’s specific
needs and interests; these include “the protection of the family, the
promotion of health, the common defense, [and] the raising of
public revenues to defray the cost of government.”65
In Prince, the Court determined that the state, as parens
patriae,66 may restrict parental control, freedom, and authority
regarding issues affecting a child’s welfare, including matters where a
parent asserts authority “to control the child’s course of conduct on
religion or conscience.”67 The Court reasoned that state intervention
can be justified because the entire community has an interest in
safeguarding children from abuses and giving them “opportunities
for growth.”68 In concluding the Prince opinion, the Court
attempted to leave the parental liberty and state intervention
battlefield untouched by declaring the Prince ruling as not extending

59. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825–26 (2d Cir. 1977).
60. Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d
Cir. 1997) (stating that parents have a “constitutionally protected” liberty interest in the
custody and care of their children).
61. Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 342 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that
state removal of a child triggers Fourteenth Amendment procedural protection).
62. Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 941 (6th Cir. 1985) (“It is well-settled that parents
have a liberty interest in the custody of their children.”).
63. 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
64. Id. at 166.
65. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1940).
66. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009) (defining parens patriae as “the
state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves”).
67. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
68. Id. at 165. This view is based on the belief that a democratic society’s continuance
rests “upon the healthy, well-grounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens,
with all that implies.” Id. at 168.
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beyond its facts.69 The Court readily declared its holding as neither
laying a foundation for state intervention in a child’s religious
indoctrination and participation under the guise of “health and
welfare,” nor giving state justification for limitations on a child’s
religious activities and training.70
Thus, tension between parental rights and significant state
interests continues to be determined on an almost case-by-case
basis.71 This determination is subject to individual states’ statutory
guidelines and judicial proceedings regarding removal and
termination in light of constitutional due process considerations.72
Although the inherent tension between these two legal doctrines
may reside within a nebulous middle ground dependent on multiple
variables, federal courts generally give due process rights serious
consideration.73 Therefore, religious parents will be provided
Fourteenth Amendment due process protection at the federal level
when unjust removal proceedings occur.
2. The state level
States also provide statutory and judicial due process defenses for
parents and for individual children. For example, as pertaining to the
YFZ Ranch situation, Texas’s Family Code requires “a full adversary
hearing” be held within fourteen days after a government agency
removes a child.74 The statute also refers to “child” in the singular
when laying out guidelines for immediate removal, judicial hearings,
and potential return.75 Accordingly, the State is required to provide
due process for each particular child when abuse allegations arise.76
Thus the State “cannot lump sexual abuse, or risk of sexual abuse, on
all” children living within a household or a community (regardless of
how the term household may be defined by that particular state)
69. Id. at 171.
70. Id.
71. See Weaver, supra note 4, at 535 (arguing that the current state of the law leaves
state courts with unresolved questions regarding weighing physical and mental harm to
children and the state’s power to intervene against a parent’s religious rights).
72. See id.; infra Part III.A.2.
73. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) (declaring that due process
protections reflect the high value, embedded in constitutional history, which society places on
a person’s rights).
74. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(a) (West 2010).
75. Id. § 262.201(b).
76. See id. § 262.201(b)(2); Weaver, supra note 4, at 497.
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without “sufficient evidence.”77 The Texas Court of Appeals
regarded this portion of the Texas Family Code as being in place
particularly to “afford parents the opportunity to challenge [an
agency’s] right to retain any children whom [the agency] has taken
into custody under an ex parte order from the court.”78
However, a potential obstacle preventing due process principles
from protecting religious parents, as demonstrated in the YFZ Ranch
scenario, derives from whether the parent will be viewed as separate
from the community to which they belong. Arguably, “parents” (in
the traditional sense) did not exist at the YFZ Ranch because DFPS
viewed them as being controlled by the larger community, and thus
DFPS imputed to each individual all aspects of the community’s
collective theological system and doctrinal actions.79 This became a
major problem during the hearing required by Texas state law to be
within fourteen days of the action.80 Because of the sheer number of
children, and the predominate view that the YFZ Ranch constituted
one household, the initial due process hearing took place en masse81
on behalf of all the children involved. The majority of the attorney
ad litems (AAL) were of the opinion the State had not carried its
burden.82 Many of these AALs (representing children who wanted to
return to their parents)83 expressed frustration that each child was
not getting an individual hearing.84 When time came for limited
questioning, each age group was given a representative to ask
questions on behalf of all AALs representing children within that
group.85
Another potential obstruction of due process protection for
religious parents arises within state juvenile courts, where
opportunities to challenge custody orders can be ignored or delayed.

77. Weaver, supra note 4, at 497 (quoting FAM. § 262.201(b)).
78. In re E.D.L., 105 S.W.3d 679, 688 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).
79. See Weaver, supra note 4, at 495 (detailing CPS supervisor Angie Voss’s explanation
that her concern for every child in the community derived from ranch residents telling her that
they were all part of “one big family and that they all share[d] the same belief system”).
80. FAM. § 262.201(a).
81. See Weaver, supra note 4, at 478 (noting that each child did not receive an
individual hearing).
82. See id. at 477–78.
83. Id. at 477.
84. Id. at 478.
85. Id. (detailing how Judge Walther allowed the representative AALs “just ‘a few
questions’ of the witnesses”) (citation omitted).
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In Pamela B. v. Ment, a group of concerned parents of children who
“had been or might be seized by the state department of children
and families” brought an action against state administrators.86 The
group was seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
regarding temporary state child custody hearings.87 The court’s
opinion detailed serious allegations of due process violations against
the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in Hartford, including the
practice of commonly holding “continuing orders of temporary
custody for . . . up to several months, without requiring or
permitting testimony and based solely upon hearsay statements
contained in affidavits and other documents.”88 The state supreme
court eventually held it as “imperative that parents be given a prompt
and meaningful opportunity to challenge an order of temporary
custody.”89
In addition, juvenile courts are often permitted to ignore the
constitutional rights of “nonoffending parents.”90 These purportedly
“unfit,” nonoffending parents are defined as individuals the State has
not made allegations against, who have not violated any statutory
requirement, and whose only wrong appears to be having “a child in
common with a parent who allegedly abused or neglected [a]
child.”91 These considerations could come into play in situations like
YFZ Ranch where parental roles morph into the “household-as-thecommunity” view,92 or in situations where only one parent adheres
to the beliefs of the community. Consequently, due process
protections are available at the state level, but may be difficult to
realistically achieve within every local agency and court system.
B. Removal and Termination Standards
Actual child removal and termination of parental rights
constitute the most extreme measure used to protect state interests

86. 709 A.2d 1089, 1093 (Conn. 1998).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1095.
89. Id. at 1100.
90. Vivek S. Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare System’s Disregard
for the Constitutional Rights of Nonoffending Parents, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 55 (2009)
(discussing how non-offending parents are often deprived of parental rights based solely on
admissions of child maltreatment from the other parent).
91. Id. at 57.
92. See supra note 78 and its accompanying text.
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and a child’s welfare.93 Courts usually decline to terminate parental
rights “unless rehabilitation of the parent is hopeless.”94 Grounds for
child removal and parental right termination vary among state
statutes,95 but normally a combination of abuse, neglect,
abandonment, drug or alcohol dependency, or parental failure to
abide by a state proscribed treatment plan for child return may
warrant state intervention.96 Each state has separate procedures for
categorizing a child as being neglected or abused and for
categorizing a parent as dependent.97 These statutory standards can
serve as tools for state removal actions to preserve or restore a child’s
safety, health, or well-being.98
In general, states follow a two-step process to determine whether
a situation requires intervention.99 This process consists of an agency
finding statutory justification for removal.100 The first step is
accomplished through a court hearing to establish whether the child
falls within that particular state’s statutory definitions of abuse,
neglect, dependency, or other elements requiring state involvement.
This is followed by step two: a dispositional hearing “to determine
whether the child should remain with the parent.”101 If these two
steps affirm that intervention is necessary and requires removal of the
child from the home, the next phase involves an agency establishing a
plan for either family reunification or parental right termination.102
The agency creates this plan by conducting additional hearings to

93. LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
FAMILY LAW 608 (2d ed. 2006).
94. Id.
95. For example, Georgia uses a two-pronged approach. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 1511-94(a) (“In considering the termination of parental rights, the courts shall first determine
whether [absent extreme circumstances] there is present and convincing evidence of parental
misconduct or inability . . . [and] whether termination . . . is in the best interest of the child”).
96. See, e.g., WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 93, at 608; CHILD WELFARE
INFORMATION GATEWAY, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION 2 (2010), available at
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/groundtermin.pdf.
97. SCOTT E. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS 121 (1992); see
also CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY supra note 96, at 2.
98. FRIEDMAN, supra note 97, at 121.
99. ROBERT E. OLIPHANT & NANCY VER STEEGH, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS:
FAMILY LAW 459 (3d ed. 2010).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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decide whether the child should enter foster care, be returned to the
parents, or placed in a specified institution.103
This process can take an accelerated pace when an immediate and
urgent need arises necessitating removal, such as when the child is in
danger of imminent death, serious injury, or sexual abuse.104 When
allegations of child abuse and neglect arise in emergency situations,
states generally follow a three-pronged approach in determining
whether immediate removal is appropriate.105 In this situation, the
State is required to 1) demonstrate “proof of imminent danger,” 2)
decide if nonremoval would be contrary to the child’s welfare, and 3)
make reasonable efforts to prevent removal.106
Despite state statutory variance, the United States Supreme
Court and Congress have given general guidelines for states to
follow for removal and termination actions. In Santosky v. Kramer,
the Supreme Court declared the evidentiary standard applicable in
these state actions.107 The Court held that before “completely and
irrevocably” severing parental rights, due process requires a State to
“support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.”108
This elevated evidentiary standard requires asserted facts to have a
high probability of being true109 and is most often applied when
fundamental rights are at risk.110 However, it is left to state courts

103. Id.
104. Id. at 459–60.
105. Jessica Dixon Weaver, The Principle of Subsidiarity Applied: Reforming the Legal
Framework to Capture the Psychological Abuse of Children, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 269
(2011).
106. Id.
107. 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982).
108. Id. Clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate evidentiary standard, viewed as
a higher hurdle than “preponderance of the evidence” but still a notch below the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard required for criminal convictions. See Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 424–25 (1979) (discussing the Court’s use of the three evidentiary standards and
noting the distinct differences between them); see also Wilson v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1284,
1298 (10th Cir. 2009) (highlighting the long history of the clear and convincing standard “as
an intermediate burden of proof somewhere between ‘preponderance of the evidence’ and
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’”) (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 424–25).
109. Lopinto v. Haines, 441 A.2d 151, 155–56 (Conn. 1981) (declaring the clear and
convincing standard as requiring evidence that induces a “reasonable belief” in the trier that
asserted facts “are highly probably true” and thus “substantially greater than the probability”
of the facts being false).
110. Nilson, supra note 45, at 312 (citing In re Polk License Revocation, 449 A.2d 7, 13
(N.J. 1982)).
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and legislatures to make exact determinations of the burden
surrounding this standard.111
In addition to judicial evidentiary guidelines for removal
procedures, Congress has also indirectly addressed this issue
legislatively through the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
of 1980 (“AACWA”) and the Adoptions and Safe Families Act of
1997 (“ASFA”).112 Although states have varying statutes dealing
with termination of parental rights, Congress imposed additional
rules on state child welfare systems through AACWA.113 AACWA’s
aim was to reorient the focus of state removal actions from being the
“first and last resort” toward a more service-first approach designed
to emphasize maintaining functional and intact families.114
The AACWA requires states to include specific elements for
removal or termination actions and proceedings.115 States are
obligated (while considering child safety as the paramount concern)
to make “reasonable efforts” in preserving and reunifying families
prior to removal and termination unless “aggravated circumstances”
exist.116 According to the United States General Accounting Office,
as of July 1999 all states had enacted laws that either mirrored
federal legislation or imposed stricter requirements.117 Because of this
111. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769–70.
112. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat.
500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Adoption and Safe Families Act
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
113. See Stephanie Sherry, Note, When Jail Fails: Amending the ASFA to Reduce Its
Negative Impact on Children of Incarcerated Parents, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 380, 382 (2010)
(discussing the history and background leading up to the adoption of AACWA and its
subsequent amendment through the ASFA).
114. Jeanne M. Kaiser, Finding a Reasonable Way to Enforce the Reasonable Efforts
Requirement in Child Protection Cases, 7 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 100, 108 (2009).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2006); see also Kaiser, supra note 114, at 107 n.23 (stating that
AACWA’s ultimate intent was to reorient the foster care system to focus more on “services
aimed at preserving families and achieving permanency for children” (quoting Will L. Crossley,
Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s Burden Under Federal Child Protection
Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 270 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A–D) (2006). The term “aggravated circumstances” is left
to be defined at the state level. In addition, the “reasonable efforts” requirement can also be
precluded when “parental rights . . . to a [removed child’s] sibling have [previously] been
terminated involuntarily.” Id.
117. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN SUBCOMM. ON
HUMAN RES., COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FOSTER CARE:
STATES’ EARLY EXPERIENCES IMPLEMENTING THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT 2
(1999), available at http://tinyurl.com/6pcl6ms.
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legislation, a majority of states require agencies to make reasonable
efforts in family preservation before removal, and to attempt
reasonable efforts in seeking reunification postremoval as a means of
preventing need for removal oversight.118
Although the “reasonable efforts” requirements potentially
provide protection to religious parents in unwarranted and
questionable removal situations, 42 U.S.C. § 671 of the AACWA
does not define “reasonable efforts” and the federal government has
evaded opportunities to provide clarification for the term beyond the
current statutory context.119 Therefore, some scholars have displayed
concern for the legislation’s “dead letter” status120 resulting from this
lack of definition and the ASFA’s amendments failure “to provide
states with a comprehensive meaning for and standards by which to
measure reasonable efforts.”121
However, religious parents and communities have assurances of
basic statutory and judicial safeguards despite overarching
occurrences at the YFZ Ranch.122 The clear and convincing
evidentiary standard, and the federal legislative requirement for
reasonable reunification efforts, can protect parental rights in
religious contexts because they require both a high level of proof and
significant agency efforts in restoring children to their families before
parental rights can ultimately be terminated.123

118. Crossley, supra note 115, at 293 n.169.
119. Id. at 260.
120. Id. The term “dead letter” refers to the frequent disregard of the “reasonable
efforts” requirement.
121. Id. at 290.
122. However, these potential safeguards would only be used in a defensive posture postremoval and would not extend to civil actions prevented by “qualified immunity.” See Foy v.
Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1534 (11th Cir. 1996) (describing the qualified immunity doctrine as
having pragmatic impact “on the reality of the workaday world”). The qualified immunity
doctrine allows public officials to act without fear of civil litigation only when they could have
reasonably anticipated, before taking action, whether their conduct might expose them to
damage liability. Id. In other words, an official receives immunity from civil damages if an
objective observer would be unable to predict whether the action was completely lawful until
adjudicated by a court in the future. Id. Thus, a religious parent who has a child unjustly
removed based upon a belief system would potentially be without civil recourse, unless it could
be shown that an objective observer in the agency’s position could anticipate the action’s
potentially illegality.
123. Granted, this does not fully consider the implication for truly endangered children
with neglectful parents in a nonreligious (or even religious) setting, but such is not within the
consideration of this Comment.
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C. “Removal Stampedes”

Despite assurances of potential legal protection, it might remain
unnerving to parents that a mass removal action (for arguably
religious reasons) recently and actually took place within the United
States at the YFZ Ranch. Even eventually vindicated religious parents
may fear the interim effect removal might have on their children and
the extreme efforts it takes to regain custody. Agencies should tread
carefully out of consideration for harm to children caused by
unnecessary removal efforts, which might be difficult for agencies
practicing “defensive social work” by “erring on the side of safety”
out of fear of adverse outcomes for the child.124
Although many children were eventually returned to YFZ
Ranch,125 arguably irreparable damage occurred during the interim
proceedings by the mere act of removal.126 Disregarding due process
and parental rights in removal actions not only brings up complex
constitutional issues, but it also “jeopardize[s] children’s safety and
well-being by increasing the likelihood that they will unnecessarily
enter foster care” and potentially suffer irreparable harm from
removal.127 Often forgotten during “removal stampedes . . . [are] the
range and extent” of psychological, financial, and other harm on the
affected families resulting from “unnecessary removals.”128 Removal
actions can be extremely difficult for children suddenly forced to
separate from familiar surroundings without possibly knowing or
understanding why.129
124. Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal in
Child Protective Proceedings, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 457, 459 (2003) (citing Douglas J. Besharov,
Protecting Abused and Neglected Children: Can Law Help Social Work?, 7 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 421 (1983)); Colin Poitras, Rowland Fires a Rebuke at DCF, HARTFORD COURANT,
May 21, 2003, at A1, available at http://tinyurl.com/6vfq7r8.
125. Authorities returned 438 children, most of who went back to the YFZ Ranch. Paul
A. Anthony, Children’s Court Advocates Frustrated by CPS’ Actions, SAN ANGELO STANDARDTIMES (Mar. 29, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.gosanangelo.com/news/2009/mar/
29/childrens-court-advocates-frustrated-by-cps/.
126. See Chill, supra note 124, at 459 (arguing that potentially irreparable harm to the
child occurs within “removal stampedes”).
127. See Sankaran, supra note 90, at 55 (noting that due process violations in juvenile
courts have the potential to cause parents to disengage with the process altogether).
128. See Chill, supra note 124, at 459 (explaining that “[r]emoved children . . . are not
necessarily safer in their new placement” and that unnecessary removals drain resources and
intensify existing child protection challenges).
129. Id. at 457 (denoting potential terror and sorrow possibly resulting in attachment
and abandonment issues in the child).
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After an emergency child removal, a convergence of factors
creates a “snowball effect,” making it difficult for parents to get the
child back.130 From a practical standpoint, postremoval proceedings
change the focus from “whether the child should be removed to
whether he or she should be returned.”131 This requires parents to
“demonstrate their fitness” for reunification, rather than requiring
the State “to demonstrate the need for out-of-home placement.”132
Seizing control of the child tilts the litigation playing field in favor of
the State, shifting the burden of proof, “in effect, if not in law,”
from the State to the parents.133 This prospectively slanted field
presents another uneasy consideration for religious parents who may
possess concerns regarding state removal actions.
In summary, although safeguards for religious parents exist,
future removal and termination actions will continue to involve an
inherent tension between parental rights and state interests. These
actions, and any potential solutions, will be determined on a
situation-specific basis and will tend to address the same questions
previously aligned on the rights and interests playing field. In
addition, these actions may create irreparable harm to both child and
parent before any potential arbitrary actions can be judicially
rectified.
IV. RELIGION AS A PRETEXT FOR REMOVAL AND TERMINATION
A. Removal and Religion: Actual Abuse and Neglect Required
In child custody hearings, the issue of religion primarily arises (if
at all) within divorce proceedings;134 therefore, religious parents have
been somewhat protected by the exclusion of religious
considerations within the (nondivorce) removal and termination
context. However, some argue that since courts can consider religion
in child custody disputes without infringing a parent’s First
Amendment rights, then courts may also consider religion in

130. Id. at 459; see also Pamela B. v. Ment, 709 A.2d 1089, 1093 (Conn. 1998)
(recognizing “the potential impact . . . ex parte temporary custody order[s],” initial custody
determinations, and continuity have on maintaining the status quo and thus influencing the
final outcome in removal based custody determinations).
131. Chill, supra note 124, at 459.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Nilson, supra note 45, at 321.
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parental termination proceedings without a First Amendment
violation.135 But, religion generally remains a nonfactor in removal
and termination measures except in instances of abuse, neglect,
abandonment, or similar areas of parental action (or inaction)
warranting child protection. The Supreme Court has upheld parents
as having the dominant role in child-rearing decisions “absent a
finding of neglect or abuse.”136 Nevertheless, the potential effect of
religious belief resulting in child mistreatment can be a tremendous
factor in a state’s removal justifications and also in determining
continuation of parental rights.137
Courts have determined that child custody decisions should
focus on individual conduct and character rather than religious
beliefs, unless the belief potentially jeopardizes a child’s health or
safety.138 In Shepp v. Shepp, a Pennsylvania case involving a parent
promoting polygamous beliefs to his child, the court held that the
parent could be prohibited from advocating a sincere religious belief,
“which, if acted upon, would constitute a crime.”139 According to
the court, this exclusion only arises if it is established that advocating
the conduct would have “potential for significant social burdens” or
endanger the child’s physical or mental health or safety.140 Even
then, the court reasoned that the conduct’s illegality was not
sufficient on its own to warrant restriction.141 Therefore, a parent’s
constitutional right to teach a religious belief to his or her child does
not constitute a per se threat of harm and cannot be infringed absent

135. Id.
136. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979).
137. See In re Edward C., 178 Cal. Rptr. 694, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (“[T]he state
must show that the parent’s religious choices [actually] jeopardize the health or safety of the
child and that the state cannot override parental choice just because it runs counter to the
tastes or lifestyles of the majority. Mistreatment of a child, however, is not privileged because it
is imposed in the guise of freedom of religious expression.”); see also Nilson, supra note 45, at
322.
138. Shepp v. Shepp, 906 A.2d 1165, 1173–74 (Pa. 2006); see, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of
Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1996) (recognizing the state’s compelling interest to protect
a minor’s psychological and physical well-being); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–34
(1972) (holding that a parent’s free exercise rights may be limited if a parent’s decisions in
relation to the belief could cause “significant social burdens” or might potentially jeopardize a
child’s health or safety).
139. Shepp, 906 A.2d at 1173–74.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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a finding that discussing the belief comprises a grave threat to the
child.142
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court adopted a similar, albeit
slightly different, position in In re Black.143 The court dealt with a
child removal action involving a polygamous family.144 The court
upheld the lower court’s finding that the children of the husband
and his second wife were neglected (as defined by Utah statute)
because their polygamous parents “knowingly failed . . . to
provide . . . the proper maintenance, care, education and training
required by law and morals.”145 The court reached this result due to
the parents’ willful avoidance of abiding by the state’s bigamy
laws.146
Early in the opinion, the court focused on the couple teaching
their children to live polygamy despite the law.147 Yet, the court
ultimately seemed to distinguish between action as opposed to mere
belief or teaching.148 The court declared that the parents not only
believed and taught that plural marriage was God’s law, but they also
actually exercised the “practice of polygamy in the presence of [the]
children.”149 According to the court, merely advocating a belief in
illegal activity is protected by the right to teach and believe religious
doctrine “so long as it does not incite to crime.”150 Similar to Shepp,
the Utah Supreme Court noted that had the parents merely accepted

142. Id.
143. 283 P.2d 887 (Utah 1955).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 907 (emphasis omitted).
146. Id. at 907–08 (detailing how the couple “embarked upon a criminal career” by not
obtaining a marriage license and “for 20 years have had, a method convenient, easy, illegal and
immoral”; or in other words, ignoring “every law established for the orderly behavior of decent
people”).
147. Id. at 896 (discussing the husband’s admission that he taught, preached, and
practiced polygamy and encouraged his children to do the same); see also id. at 869–99
(detailing testimony from multiple family members on this same subject).
148. Id. at 901, 907.
149. Id. at 901.
150. Id. at 907 (qualifying this statement by declaring that such a right would not
prevent the parents from falling within Utah’s child negligence statute because of the law’s
specific requirement that a child be provided the care necessary for its “health, morals or wellbeing”). But see Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (stating that if a religious belief
were to become a crime, then teaching and advising its practice would be considered aiding
and abetting and thus subject to criminal prosecution), abrogated on other grounds by Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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and affirmed polygamy as a matter of belief only, “they would
probably not [have been] subject to a proceeding such as this.”151
Hence, according to the Shepp and Black rationale, subscribing
to and teaching a religious belief (even when implementing the belief
may result in illegal conduct) does not warrant child removal and
parental rights termination unless the belief actually results in illegal
conduct or harm to the child.152 But it is uncertain whether this is a
bona fide, albeit partial, protection to religious parents. For example,
statutory discrimination153 could motivate a legislative body to pass a
law directly (but not overtly) targeting a specific religious belief or
practice, justified by the damage the tenant may cause to society’s
“morals and good order.”154 If this were to happen, a now illegal
religious practice could lead to immediate child removal and
potential parental right termination, even if the law were found
posttermination to be unconstitutional.
The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah
case provides a possible illustration.155 In Lukumi, a denomination of
the Santeria religion attempted to conduct animal sacrifices.156
Santerian doctrine includes the belief that animal sacrifices are a
necessary part of its adherents’ faith and rites must be performed at
significant life events, such as birth, marriage, and death.157 Because
151. Black, 283 P.2d at 901.
152. See id. But see Davis, 133 U.S. at 342 (stating that if a religious belief were to
become a crime, then teaching and advising its practice would be considered aiding and
abetting and thus subject to criminal prosecution).
153. Attempting to prove a government entity acted with discriminatory intent in a
removal context might be problematic, in that “state officials can act lawfully even when
motivated” by dislike or hostility toward specific protected behavior. Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d
1528, 1534 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)); see also Foy,
94 F.3d at 1536 (holding that a child custody worker is entitled to immunity “unless it was
already clearly established when [the worker] acted that no child custody worker could lawfully
act—that is, do what [the worker] did—to protect children in the circumstances of this case if
the worker also acted, in part, out of hostility toward the parent’s religion”).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, C.J.
dissenting) (“The battle for religious liberty has been fought and won with respect to religious
beliefs and practices, which are not in conflict with good order.”), overruled in part by
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); Davis, 133 U.S. at 342 (holding that religious
actions cannot be contrary to peace, good order, and society’s morals); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (declaring Congress’s ability to prohibit religious actions that
violate social duties or subvert good order).
155. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
156. Id. at 525.
157. Id.
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of concerns that a religious group may engage in practices
inconsistent with “public morals, peace or safety,” the city council
passed ordinances directly, but not explicitly, targeted towards
outlawing Santerian animal sacrifices.158 The Supreme Court
overturned the ordinances because city officials specifically designed
the laws to suppress “the central element of the Santeria worship
service.”159 Here, “religious practice [was] being singled out for
discriminatory treatment” by broad ordinances forbidding religious
worship that did not threaten a city’s legitimate interests in
preventing animal cruelty.160
Using Lukumi to explore a hypothetical example, it is possible
that religious parents in a Lukumi-type situation could be viewed as
negligent under a law similar to the Utah child negligence statute
used in Black because they could potentially incite the children to
engage in criminal conduct. Thus, the State could remove the
children and terminate parental rights because the parents attempted
to practice (or even teach) a currently illegal religious belief. Again,
by way of illustration, parents in Lukumi would presumably have
continued teaching the religious belief of sacrificing animals despite
Florida passing a city ordinance making the practice against the law.
In a Lukumi-type scenario under the Utah child negligence statute
in Black, it is at least questionable whether parents would be allowed
to teach, believe in, or practice this tenant without losing their
children. In such a situation, it is also possible that all parents
belonging to the Lukumi religious community could lose custody of
their children if those parents were ascribed the greater community’s
belief, despite a lack of evidence that they intended to practice the
belief or encourage their children to do so (as happened at YFZ
Ranch).161
158. Id. at 526. The city council enacted an emergency ordinance fully incorporating
Florida’s existing animal cruelty laws, and then declared Hialeah city policy opposing ritual
animal sacrifices. Id. at 527. In addition, the city council adopted ordinances defining
“sacrifice” as harmful actions towards animals not accomplished “for the primary purpose of
food consumption” and prohibited animal ownership for groups or individuals who perform
animal sacrifices (even when intended for strictly food purposes), but exempted licensed
slaughtering establishments. Id. at 527–28. The city also received confirmation from the
Florida Attorney General that the ordinances would align with state law prohibiting religious
animal sacrifice. Id. at 527.
159. Id. at 534–35.
160. Id. at 538.
161. One obvious, but noteworthy, distinction between this Lukumi illustration and the
Shepp and Black cases is that the Court in Lukumi examined whether the animal sacrifice
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Therefore, religious parents might still rationally fear a broad
removal action if their ascribed belief potentially became unpopular,
and thus against the law. As in Lukumi, it could be possible for a
supposedly neutral law of general applicability to be passed against a
religious practice that the majority believes to be against public
health, safety, or morals. This could consequently subject religious
parents to potential child removal actions for attempting to teach a
prohibited practice, even if the law were later found posthearing to
be unconstitutional. Or, in the case of YFZ Ranch, this could subject
parents to removal and rights terminations for merely belonging to a
religious group and living within the group’s community, whether or
not the parents actually subscribed to the belief, planned on living it,
or expected their children to potentially do so as well.
Although Shepp and Black are only state cases with limited
precedential value or influence, they potentially provide examples of
protection religious parents can receive regarding teaching religious
beliefs to their children, even when those beliefs directly (or
indirectly) contravene statutory constructions. By relation, this
would extend to fringe and nonmainstream beliefs because “religious
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible
to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”162
In summary, courts seem to draw a line when the belief itself
constitutes a grave threat of harm, potentially resulting from living
the belief in the children’s presence. Yet, a potential challenge for
religious parents may arise if a facially neutral law is passed targeting
a sect’s religious practice under the guise of protecting public health,
safety and morals; but, parents may possess a certain level of legal
safety when teaching that religious belief to their children. However,
this level of protection could be diminished when a government
agency arbitrarily ascribes to parents the beliefs (and future actions
regarding those beliefs) held by the religious community or sect they
belong to. And a final difficulty is the question of how a particular
court would construe the phrase “grave threat,” “harm,” or
“neglect,” and what type of religious tenant might be perceived as
potentially causing “significant social burdens,”163—especially
prohibition was directly targeted toward the sect and not the impact of the sect’s teachings in a
family environment.
162. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
163. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–34 (1972) for particular uses of “harm”
and “significant social burdens.” Another question concerns a court’s role in construing such
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considering that such ambiguity in a relevant state’s child welfare law
is usually “resolved with reference to the public policy goals
underlying” the statute.164
B. Removal and Religion: Lessons from YFZ Ranch
The YFZ Ranch case demonstrates that a state agency may view
the possibility of a belief being possessed and potentially practiced at
a future time (e.g., FLDS mothers encouraging their sons and
daughters to “spiritually marry” at an early age) as creating grave
harm to children, regardless of evidence that a particular parent
personally taught the belief to their child. Such agency determination
can be alarming to parents within a religious community who might
be ascribed a belief involving illegal conduct with “potential” for the
belief being lived at some future time.
In the YFZ Ranch case, a pervasive religious belief system held by
a “family” of believers was alleged to have risen to abusive levels
based on current and future effects of perpetuating the belief, thus
potentially placing all children in danger and creating an urgent need
to remove the children from the community.165 Underage marriage
constituted the abusive belief assumed to be held by the community
that required immediate removal of all children.166 The sect’s
“mindset” that young girls could marry at “whatever age” and that a
female’s “highest blessing” is to have children created enough
concern within DFPS to necessitate the immediate removal of all
children in the community and displayed the agency’s apparent focus
on the religious aspects of the community.167 Absent the belief
regarding marriage, all of the children (other than five minors
pregnant at the time of the raid168) probably would have remained at

phrases. Are these questions of policy that should be left to the state legislatures that passed the
law? See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 652 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.
dissenting) (noting that although “conscientious scruples” override “religious scruples” when
major state concerns are involved, judges should be diffident when setting their judgment
against the state in the policy realm of differentiating between major and minor state concerns
and in determining “what means are appropriate to proper ends”).
164. Sealed v. Sealed, 332 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 2003).
165. Affidavit, supra note 19, at 5–6.
166. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. 2008) (as
determined by DFPS in interviews with various community members).
167. Id. at *2.
168. See, e.g., TEX. DEP’T OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVS., ELDORADO
INVESTIGATION: A REPORT FROM THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE
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the ranch.169 However, viewing the belief as abuse necessitating
removal required assuming the belief to be held by all parents within
the community. It also required the inferential step that those
parents would inevitably act on the belief either eventually or in the
immediate future. It is doubtful whether state action upon such
inferences could be justified given due process, clear and convincing
evidentiary standards, and other removal considerations previously
discussed.
Protection of religious parents’ rights are enhanced by specific
statutory and judicial safeguards, as exemplified by those afforded the
YFZ parents who questioned the state’s assumptions and reasoning
regarding their individual belief system. For example, DFPS’s actions
in the case largely fell within the “immediate danger” and urgent
need aspect of child removal.170 In these types of “immediate and
urgent” actions, the Texas Family Code (“TFC”) requires DFPS to
file suit regarding the parent-child relationship and request an initial
hearing to be held no later than the first working day after
removal.171 In addition, TFC requires a full adversarial hearing no
later than fourteen days after the government agency takes
possession of the child.172 These requirements demonstrate the
previously discussed two-part process of statutory justification and
plan creation173 essential to protecting parental rights. This is done
by ensuring agency actions are immediately reviewed to determine
whether requirements for removal were met and that a plan can be
put forth for potential reunification.
In addition, these statutory requirements place a presumption on
reunification. Under the TFC, in an emergency removal situation,
the agency must provide sufficient evidence to prove that: 1) the
child’s physical health or safety was in danger, 2) there was an urgent
need for protection requiring the child’s immediate removal, and 3)
reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for
removal, otherwise “the court shall order the return of the child to

SERVICES 7 (2008) [hereinafter ELDORADO INVESTIGATION], available at http://
www.dfps.state.tx.us/documents/about/pdf/2008-12-22_Eldorado.pdf.
169. Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *4.
170. See, e.g., ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 168, at 7.
171. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.105(a) (West 2010).
172. Id. § 262.201(a).
173. See supra Part III.
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the parent.”174 However, the Court of Appeals of Texas held that
DFPS failed to carry its required statutory burden,175 and the court
seemed to see through the religious pretext for the removal. The
Supreme Court of Texas also affirmed the appellate court decision
and held that “removal of the children was not warranted.”176
The Texas Appellate Court examined DFPS’s actions within the
context of each individual statutory prong. First, the court
determined the FLDS belief system did not, itself, put the children in
any physical danger.177 Second, the court held that DFPS failed to
establish the need for urgent and immediate removal because of a
lack of evidence that each child in the community was in immediate
danger.178 The court debunked the notion that YFZ was a
community household by citing a lack of evidence that the removed
pregnant minors were living in the same household as the other
children.179 In addition, there was no evidence the parents “may
someday” allow future sexual abuse warranting the “extreme
measure of immediate removal.”180 There was also no evidence
FLDS mothers were likely to force their “pubescent female children
to underage marriage or sex.”181 And, third, the court stated that
DFPS did not make any reasonable efforts to ascertain if “some
measure short of removal and/or separation from parents would
have eliminated” the perceived risk.182
This is significant for religious parents because the court implies
that a belief system alone cannot place children in immediate physical
danger, but rather it is the outcome from imposing “certain alleged
tenets . . . on specific individuals” that may be brought into
question.183 It is unlikely that a court or agency could justifiably
predict that a parent will undoubtedly subject his or her child to a
future underage marriage, or anything of a similar theological nature
construed as a dangerous aspect of a particular parent’s religion. A
174. FAM. § 262.201(b)(1)–(3).
175. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3 (Tex. App. 2008).
176. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex. 2008).
177. Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3.
178. Id.
179. Id. Witnesses stated that the community was actually divided into separate groups
and households. Id. at *3 n.10.
180. Id. at *3.
181. Id.
182. Id. at *4.
183. Id. at *3.
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court will likely determine that a mere teaching or belief does not
incite removal when a state’s statutory requirements for removal
include: 1) actual jeopardizing of health or safety, 2) high evidentiary
standards regarding urgent need for immediate removal, and 3)
reasonable agency efforts for reunification. In addition, if state
statutes and judicial systems seemingly fail in protecting against
potentially inequitable removal actions, religious parents have
standing in federal courts to seek redress if they feel their parental
rights have been violated by discriminate state action.184
Thus, in custody cases involving state intervention, an important
safeguard to religious parents and communities will be court actions
similar to those in Texas where astute judges hold agencies strictly
accountable to narrowly construed statutory requirements, which
must be met independent of religious persuasion and organizational
doctrine imputed to the believers in question. Rather, future
adjudications may likely focus on individualized parental actions (or
omissions) autonomously chosen and proven regardless of which
church, sect, or religious community the parent belongs to. Such a
direction will also prove more efficient for agencies similar to DFPS
because they will not need to attempt to decipher religious
requirements via postabduction interviews as a means of justifying
previous removal actions.
V. CONCLUSION: IS THE ONLY THING RELIGIOUS PARENTS HAVE
TO FEAR IS FEAR ITSELF?
Under the guise of child protection and state interests, DFPS
removed virtually all children from the YFZ Ranch because the
community was perceived to have a pervasive belief system that
included underage marriage and sexual activity for minor females.
DFPS considered the YFZ Ranch community to constitute one
family unit and concluded that every parent of the community
ascribed to the sect’s entire belief system. DFPS also assumed each
FLDS community member would subscribe to, teach, and eventually
practice underage marriage. The potential for practicing the belief
system supposedly jeopardized each minor child within the YFZ
Ranch because parental application of the belief would raise minor

184. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1525
(11th Cir. 1993) (“Religious groups and their members that are signaled out for
discriminatory government treatment . . . have standing to seek redress in federal courts.”).
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females to be subjects of abuse, and boys would be raised to become
perpetrators of sexual abuse. This threat purportedly created an
immediate and urgent need, in the opinion of the DFPS, to abruptly
remove all minor children from the community. Thus, male and
female minors (including infants) were taken on the basis of
potential, future adherence to a “pervasive belief system” ascribed to
parents as members of a larger religious community.
DFPS’s action potentially raises questions for other religious
parents and communities regarding whether their children could also
be removed, and their parental rights terminated, because of a
pervasive religious belief they or their religious community hold.
However, religious parents and communities generally should not
fear broad future state removal and termination proceedings
regarding their children unless there are larger issues of abuse,
neglect, or abandonment surrounding religious beliefs.
Typically, judicial and statutory protections will prevent removal
and termination justifications based solely upon religious teaching or
belief. For example, parents will be afforded due process because of
the fundamental nature of parental rights in raising and teaching
their children; any government action in this area must adhere to the
“clear and convincing” evidentiary standard. Statutory provisions,
such as those in the YFZ Ranch case, generally contain “reasonable
effort” requirements in preserving and reunifying families. Courts, as
demonstrated by the Texas Supreme and Appellate Court, will
necessarily review justifications for regular and emergency removals,
and also adjudicate proposed long-term plans for the child. Finally,
teaching and belief will not warrant state intervention absent actual
abuse or neglect.
However, religious parents and communities should still
maintain a reserved fear of government action regarding child
removal and termination because of certain arbitrary elements
remaining within the process. Despite parental due process rights,
state action can still be statutorily and judicially justified when
involving a child’s well-being or state interests in “public order.”
Broad government agency and/or judicial interpretation of
potentially subject terms like “welfare,” “abuse,” and “public order”
could counteract and trump other parental protections and
considerations extending beyond typical scenarios.185 For example, in

185. See Mark R. Brown, Rescuing Children from Abusive Parents: The Constitutional
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the YFZ Ranch case, DFPS removed children in danger of abuse
despite lack of confirming evidence that abuse had taken place, or
that potential for abuse was present. As it turned out, the initial call
accusing a community member of abuse was a hoax.186 Had the
Texas statutory scheme or judicial decrees viewed “abuse” and
“welfare” as broadly as DFPS, the outcome may have warranted fullfledged fear for religious parents and communities everywhere. To
help remedy broad statutory readings bringing about this possible
outcome in the future, ambiguous terminology in child removal
statutes should be refined and enhanced.187
In addition, broad statutory interpretation, direct statutory
discrimination, or a hostile view of a particular belief system, might
jeopardize perceived parental protections currently in existence. Even
the statutory requirement for reasonable agency efforts in preserving
and reunifying families may be trumped by perceived “aggravating
circumstances” viewed by governing, administrative, and judicial
bodies as negating the possibility for reunification. “Aggravating
circumstances,” unless specifically defined, can be a subjective phrase
open to interpretation that is hostile to religious parents associated
with fringe, or even mainstream, communities. This is compounded
by some state action shifting the statutory balance from “aggravating
circumstances” toward a more harm-centered approach and the
arguably dead-letter status of the reasonable efforts clause.
And finally, fear of removal for religious reasons might still be
justified by the fact that such an occurrence as the YFZ Ranch case
actually and recently happened. Although many children were
eventually returned to their parents and homes on the Ranch,
removal arguably caused irreparable social and mental harm during
interim proceedings after the children were forcibly taken.
Although safeguards for religious parents exist, future removal
and termination cases involving the tension between parental rights
and state interests also contain potential pitfalls that may create
justified (albeit reserved) fear in the minds of religious parents and
Value of Pre-Deprivation Process, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 913, 960 (2004) (“Dependency laws . . .
uniformly rely on ambiguous criteria, like ‘abuse’ and ‘neglect,’ without providing true
guidance to social workers and welfare agencies.”).
186. Teague, supra note 20 (the caller was considered a real person in the investigation
up until May 18, 2008, at which point authorities acknowledged she did not exist).
187. See Howard Davidson, Child Protection Policy and Practice at Century’s End, 33
FAM. L.Q. 765, 774 (1999) (asserting that “it is time to seriously consider changes in the
fundamental ways in which child abuse and neglect are defined and responded to”).
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communities within the United States. As the Court stated in United
States v. Ballard, “If one could be sent to jail because a jury in a
hostile environment found [that person’s religious] teachings false,
little indeed would be left of religious freedom.”188 Similarly, a
religious parent might state, “If one could have their children
removed because a city, state, or agency in a hostile environment
found the parent’s religious teachings against health, safety, or public
order, little indeed may be left of religious freedom and parental
rights.”


Keith W. Barlow

188. 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
 J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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